I present three long-term biodiversity case studies, conducted by biologists at Harvard Forest, UC Berkeley and Hamaarag Israel and joined by a philosopher of science utilizing an involved philosophy approach. I suggest that such an approach more easily stripes of ‘incommensurability’ from its common philosophical conflation with ‘empirical equivalence’, ‘underdeterminism’ and ‘indeterminacy of reference’. In that sense, involvement in routine scientific practice can improved our philosophical investigation. In addition, becoming involved in routine re-surveys helped reveal how conceptual ambiguities hamper scientific replication. In that sense, a philosophical involvement in science helped improve the latter’s validity and trustworthiness. Finally, I will reflect on the conceptual, practical and ethical assumptions of an “involved philosophy” approach, and illustrate its relevance to other aspects of science and society.
It takes one to know one:
involved philosophy and scientific replication